To many, Brazil is the best footballing nation of all time. Their five World Cup wins provides them a strong argument to lay claim to that title.

All this while playing an exciting and highly skilful brand of football – which has come to be known as ‘jogo bonito’.

Jogo bonito literally translates into ‘the beautiful game’.

It is a free, expressive brand of football which has often drawn a likeness to the samba dance – which is also synonymous with the South American nation.

In fact, jogo bonito is often seen to be a perfect fusion of dance and football, drawing likenesses to the Brazilian martial art – Capoeira.

Capoeira – like jogo bonito – finds its roots in the Brazil’s vibrant culture of dance.

In both cases, incredible sporting ability is mixed with the flare, confidence and excitement found in Brazilian samba.

This exciting blend of free-flowing expression with footballing brilliance is why many fans fall in love with the beautiful game. It is why if you ask so many fans from around the world their favourite player, names like Ronaldinho, Neymar and Kaka will so often crop up.

However, jogo bonito alone could not win championships. Football is about more than skill and expression, it also takes defensive ability, balance and tactical acumen.

Brazil had all of these in abundance at the 1958 World Cup, where in the final, they triumphed over hosts Sweden 5-2.

The International Debut of the 4-2-4

The Brazilian national side have always been trailblazers in a number of facets of the game – this includes on the tactical front.

The 1958 World Cup saw the Seleҫão debut a new formation that had never before been seen on the international stage – the 4-2-4.

Taking great inspiration from Hungary’s Golden Team, whose formation often morphed into a similar shape in-game.

There was a certain boldness to implementing a 2-man midfield, placing a high degree of trust on the midfielders who served in a prototypical box to box role – this move was intended to allow the side to always be able to attack or defend with six men.

This was also the first international debut of a flat back four – somewhat of a revolutionary move at the time that has since become commonplace in the modern game. This also allowed for ‘flying wing backs’ – an exciting move that blurred the lines between defence and attack.

The Roots of the 4-2-4

The Hungarian links go deeper than simply Gustáv Sebes’ national side. In fact, the first instance in which a side was seen to line up in a 4-2-4 was within the Hungarian domestic leagues.

It is believed that the first club to do this was MTK Budapest FC – the club of Nándor Hidegkuti.

The system was implemented by Márton Buvoki, who utilised it to suit Hidegkuti’s unique skillset and to mirror the role which he undertook in the Hungarian national team.

This tactical role of a withdrawn forward, dropping deeper in the forward line than was traditional became known as a false nine. In the Brazilian culmination of the 4-2-4 this role was undertook by Pelé – a young prospect at the time who was competing in his first World Cup.

Pelé’s role within the Brazilian system intended to serve a similar purpose to Hidegkuti in both MTK and the Golden Team, however, he was much more aggressive in attack – playing as what could be more aptly described as a shadow striker.

The tactical formation made its way across the Atlantic through coach Béla Guttmann, who moved to become the head coach at São Paolo after leaving Honvéd in the Hungarian League.

After a hugely successful period in the 1940s, the Brazilian side were struggling to emulate similar outcomes in the 1950s. Guttmann became a club icon after bringing the State Championship back to the club in 1957.

The formation was then instilled in the national side by Flávio Costa during his stint as manager. Vicente Feola took the reins in 1958 but maintained the formation into the World Cup – bringing Brazil their first ever World Cup title.

The Inner-Workings of Seleҫão’s Tactical Set-up

It is important to establish that the modern understanding of a 4-2-4 system, is different to the 4-2-4 that was utilised by Brazil.

Brazil’s 4-2-4 was much more of a hybrid system defensively, rather than a pure version of the flat back four that is used so often in the modern era.

An extra man (Hilderaldo Bellini) was put into the defensive line with the intention of lessening the space between defenders that the opposition could exploit. This was made particularly prominent due to the wealth of attacking options that teams had through the popular WM, 3-3-4, and 2-3-5 formations of the time.

However despite the fact that Bellini had been moved into the back line, he was still granted a high level of positional freedom as well as scope to get forward to a degree that is rarely seen in the modern day.

Bellini and his defensive counterparts were also tasked with taking on a creative role in starting the attacks. Jogo bonito was instilled into this Brazilian side on both ends of the pitch, the on-ball confidence and the distributional skills of the defence were used to full effect when attacking moves were initiated by the side.

As aforementioned, the Seleҫão set up with only two players in their midfield. However, their workload was shared by the left-sided forward – Mário Zagallo.

When Brazil were out of possession, Zagallo would drop deeper than the rest of the forward line, stepping into the midfield in order to create a 4-3-3 out of possession. He would then push back up when Brazil won the ball to resume his duties on the left wing.

Pelé, in turn, typically sat deeper when the side were in possession. Sitting behind Vavá and taking on a role that was comparable to an aggressive version of the modern number ten, or a shadow striker.

The star of the team was Garrincha. Although he started on the right wing, he was given significant freedom of movement which often materialised itself as him taking up position in the right sided half-space.

As a result, the right sided fullback – Santos – would often push high up the pitch and offer crosses from a deep-right position. This served to free Garrincha from his duties as a traditional winger, and allowed him to push towards areas which were more threatening to the opposition.

The Final

 The final score line was indicative of the Brazilian ideology of outscoring their opposition rather than trying to sit back and defend their goal.

Brazil’s 5-2 win still holds the record for the highest scoring World Cup final to this day.

The Seleҫão went down just four minutes in to a goal from Swedish captain Nils Liedholm.

However a Vavá brace sent them into the half time break up 2-1.

In the second half their brilliance truly came into fruition as two goals from wonderkid Pelé, as well as one for left winger Zagallo, rendered Simonsson’s late goal little more than a consolation.

Brazil had thrilled crowds with their jogo bonito style and their expansive 4-2-4 formation, however more importantly they had showcased that it worked on the biggest stage.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *